![]() The secondary goal of the paper is to argue that most, if not all, substantivists about truth should find form-based pluralism independently attractive. In particular, in Section 1, I argue that there are several serious obstacles in the way of the domain-based pluralist who wishes to endorse Cotnoir's proposal in Section 2, I show how the form-based pluralist can overcome these difficulties. The primary goal of this paper is to argue that Cotnoir's proposal is amenable to form-based pluralism, rather than domain-based pluralism. While this is consistent with the basic tenets of truth pluralism, it is an open question whether or not it is amenable to any actual pluralist theory. The basic idea is to maintain that, if a sentence says of itself that it is not true in a certain way, then that sentence is not apt to be true in that way, but is instead apt to be true (. Aaron Cotnoir (“Pluralism and Paradox” in: Pedersen and Wright (eds) Truth and pluralism: current debates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) has suggested a “uniquely pluralist response to the liar”. ![]() Truth pluralists say that there are many ways to be true. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Philosophy of logic, Harvard, 1970/1986. JOHN CORCORAN, Review of sixth printing of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. JOHN CORCORAN, Review of Quine’s 1970 Philosophy of Logic. This lecture presents and analyses two-method errors in the logic literature. ![]() But Quine never explicitly acknowledged, described, or even mentioned the error. The logical TME in, which eluded Quine’s colleagues, was corrected in the 1978 sixth printing. Quine’s discussions in the 1970 first printing of Philosophy of logic and in previous lectures were vitiated by mixing two. There are several standard ways of defining truth using sequences. But a pragmatic TME occurs in trying to deny that Abe knows Ben by using ‘It isn’t that Abe doesn’t know Ben’. One can deny that Abe knows Ben by prefixing ‘It isn’t that’ or by interpolating ‘doesn’t’. But syntactical TMEs are in ‘Abe knows what Ben looks’ and in ‘Abe knows how Ben looks like’. One can say “Abe knows how Ben looks” using ‘Abe knows what Ben looks like’. But a stylistic TME occurs in ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws or not’. ) ways: ‘Abe knows whether or not Ben draws’ or ‘Abe knows whether Ben draws or not’. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |